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I.

Introduction
In the heavily publicized Kennewick Man case,3 a battle over the rights to study or to

rebury the remains of a 9,000-year-old skeleton found in Washington state, Magistrate Judge
John Jelderks touched off a significant tangential debate to the case in chief: What are the federal
agencies’ powers under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA)4 to limit
or control the scientific study of archaeological materials? This question does not implicate the
hotly debated law, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),5
which was the focus of the Kennewick Man case, but rather calls into question the relative

3

Bonnichsen v. U.S., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (D.Or. 2002). The Ninth Circuit also rendered opinions in this
matter. Although those decisions do not have any bearing on the research herein, as the question of scientific study
of archaeological materials was not reached therein, the reader is directed to those cases for a more complete
appreciation of the Kennewick Man case. See generally, Bonnichsen v. U.S., 357 F.3d 962 (C.A. 9 2004);
Bonnichsen v. U.S., 367 F.3d 864 (C.A. 9 2004).
4
16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.
5
25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.
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freedom of research that scientists have operated under throughout the history of past human
studies in the United States.
Specifically, Judge Jelderks had this to say about the study of the Kennewick Man
remains: the remains must be made available for study to “qualified professionals,”6 “subject to
the type of reasonable terms and conditions that normally apply to studies of archaeological
resources under ARPA.”7 What are these “reasonable terms and conditions”? Until now, no
scholars examining the Kennewick Man or NAGPRA debates have questioned the meaning of
this charge by Jelderks. This paper focuses on identifying what limits, if any, exist in ARPA to
carry out the charge of Judge Jelderks.
The implications of this question reach far beyond the Kennewick Man debate. In reality,
the question of whether or not, or to what extent, the federal government can impose limitations
on the scientific study of archaeological materials derived from federal or Indian lands (the scope
of ARPA is discussed more fully infra) could have far-reaching consequences that, dependant on
the agenda of the politicians controlling the executive agencies, could have a chilling effect on
all archaeological research. The ramifications surrounding this question are not limited to
Kennewick Man or even ancient human remains research. Therefore, aside from this brief
introduction to the problem, such contexts are not considered further in this article.
As an initial matter, it is important to have a basic understanding of what ARPA is before
analyzing the more minute components of the law. On a very rudimentary level, ARPA has
been, for nearly thirty years, the legislation that controls the permitting of archaeological

6
7

Bonnichsen, supra, note 3 at 1166.
Bonnichsen, supra, note 3 at 1167.
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excavations on federal and Indian lands.8

The law and its attendant regulations contain

provisions requiring professional qualifications to secure excavation permits,9 criminal and civil
penalties for looting archaeological sites and other violations,10 and the identification of a
suitable repository institution for excavated collections to be stored along with arrangements
therefor.11
The research for this article has led to an ultimate conclusion that, as set forth more fully,
infra, ARPA does not provide federal agencies with the power to limit the scope of scientific
study on covered archaeological materials. The only possible portion of the law that could
arguably represent a limitation to study is the requirement that permits under ARPA be issued
only to qualified individuals. This author does not believe that such a requirement rises to the
level of limiting scientific study, but rather merely ensures that it is science that will be carried
out when study of archaeological materials is concerned. This limitation keeps anyone from
doing whatever he or she wants for the study of an ARPA-covered item, whenever he or she
wants and however he or she wants to do it. This provision merely ensures that the study of
archaeological materials remains within the realm of science. This provision does not, nor does
any other provision of ARPA, provide federal agencies with the authority to act as scientific
dictators with ARPA-covered archaeological materials.

8

See Roberto Iraola, The Archaeological Resources Protection Act - Twenty Five Years Later, 42 DUQ. L.
REV. 221, 222 (2004).
9
16 U.S.C. 470cc.
10
16 U.S.C. 470ee and 16 U.S.C. 470ff. For a comprehensive review of the criminal and civil penalty
provisions of ARPA, a topic beyond the scope of this paper, the reader is directed to Iraola, supra, note 8. An
interesting example of ARPA in action in criminal matters can be found in United States v. Austin, 902 F.2d 743
(C.A. 9 1990).
11
16 U.S.C. 470dd.
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II.

The Standard of Regulatory Review
Before embarking on an in-depth review of ARPA, it is necessary to understand the

scope of review that will be applied herein to the question of the ability of agencies to limit
scientific study under ARPA. As is more fully analyzed below, there is no authority, from a
plain reading of ARPA, for the government to dictate the scope of scientific research. Because
of the absence of such language, a review is herein undertaken of the law and its attendant
regulations to determine if the federal agencies are granted the power to so restrict scientific
study. As of the writing of this article, there is no existing regulation that explicitly or implicitly
grants the agencies such authority and the assumptions herein are posited solely for the purpose
of analyzing Judge Jelderks’ charge in Bonnichsen.12
The review of an agency’s rulemaking authority is governed by the standards of Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council.13 In Chevron, the question before the
Supreme Court was whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had properly
interpreted its authority under the Clean Air Act’s 1977 amendments to promulgate and apply
certain regulations related to stationary source pollution.14 In ultimately reaching the decision
that the EPA had properly interpreted its authority, the Court articulated a two-part inquiry to
determine the reasonableness of such interpretations. First, it must be asked if Congress has
“directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”15 Second, if not, is the agency’s response to
the issue “based on a permissible construction of the statute?”16
12

Bonnichsen, supra, note 3 at 1167.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14
Id. at 840.
15
Id. at 842.
16
Id. at 843.
13
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It is within this general

framework that the question of federal agency powers to limit scientific study under ARPA is
addressed. These specific questions will be completely analyzed in the Discussion.
Another authority that substantially guides the analysis herein is the Supreme Court’s
approach to analyzing agency interpretations of statutory law in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer
Company.17 In that case, the Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of Treasury regulations
as applied to the question of whether or not two closely-held corporations constituted a brothersister-controlled corporate group. The process of analyzing an agency’s authority, as articulated
by the Vogel Court, to promulgate and enforce specific regulations provides the depth of analysis
necessary for a comprehensive understanding of ARPA.
The Vogel Court begins by noting the deference generally afforded to agencies if it is
clear that the regulations implement the congressional mandate.18 The Court also asked whether
or not the agency has a source of authority to promulgate such a regulation.19 This aspect of the
case guides much of this ARPA analysis, as it is doubtful that the deference noted above is due
based on the absence of any language regarding scientific study in ARPA. Thus, this review
examines the question of whether some implicit authority exists in ARPA for such federal action.
In so doing, pursuant to the Vogel analysis, the legislative history of ARPA is examined.
Additionally, an in pari materia20 examination of all of the statutes related to historic
preservation and archaeological resources is undertaken. According to Vogel, the question of
17

455 U.S. 16 (1982).
Id. at 24.
19
Id.
20
In pari materia analyses are used to examine statutes along with surrounding statutes in order to gain a
more complete appreciation of the contextual relevance of a particular law. According to Black’s Law Dictionary
(8th ed.), an in pari materia analysis “is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be
18
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whether the regulation “harmonize[s] with the statutory language”21 is examined. Finally, the
limitation of scientific study under ARPA is subjected to the Vogel tenet that a regulation does
not have to be “sustained simply because it is not ‘technically inconsistent’ with the statutory
language, when the regulation is fundamentally at odds with the manifest congressional
design.”22
III.

ARPA’s Purpose
In Bonnichsen, Judge Jelderks charged that studies of the Kennewick Man remains can

only be limited by reasonable terms for research under ARPA.23 This charge necessarily raises
the question: What are the limits to archaeological research under ARPA?
No understanding of the true nature of a statute may be had without completing a detailed
examination of the purposes of that law stated in the law itself as well as in its legislative history.
The stated purpose of ARPA is to “secure...the protection of archaeological resources and sites
which are on public lands and Indian lands and to foster increased cooperation and exchange of
information

between

governmental

authorities

[and]

the

professional

archaeological

community.”24 From this stated purpose, it appears that ARPA was intended to protect against
one thing: pothunting.25

This is further bolstered by the Congressional findings.26

These

findings identify the threats to archaeological materials and sites as “their commercial
construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same
subject.”
21
Vogel, supra, note 17 at 25.
22
Id. at 26.
23
Bonnichsen, supra, note 3 at 1167.
24
16 U.S.C. 470aa(b).
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attractiveness”27 and inadequate protection from destruction due to “uncontrolled excavations
and pillage.”28 Nowhere in the Congressional findings29 or in the statement of purpose of
ARPA30 is there any mention that the law was intended to guard against scientific analyses of
archaeological materials. Indeed, it appears that such scientific analyses are precisely what
ARPA is intended to protect archaeological sites and materials for.31
On its face, ARPA, as it is written in the United States Code, does not restrict any
scientific research.32 Because the purpose of ARPA, as stated in the United States Code, does
not contain any language that refers to limiting research or charges for preservation,33 a review of
the congressional history of this law is necessary to a complete understanding of its purpose.

25

A pothunter is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “[o]ne who finds or obtains objects of
archaeological interest or value, esp. by unscientific or illicit methods, and for the purpose of private collection or
profit.”
26
16 U.S.C. 470aa(a).
27
16 U.S.C. 470aa(a)(2).
28
16 U.S.C. 470aa(a)(3).
29
16 U.S.C. 470aa(a).
30
16 U.S.C. 470aa(b).
31
It should be noted that, while it is clear from the analysis herein that ARPA was intended to preserve
archaeological materials for the purpose of study, this may not be the legislation’s sole purpose. Other implicit
purposes may include the reassertion of federal ownership of resources on federal land and the protection of
archaeological resources for educational display and for public access to ruins.
32
The purpose of ARPA, that being for the protection of archaeological materials from pothunting and
illicit trade in antiquities, is supported by numerous law review articles. See, Stephanie Ann Ades, The
Archaeological Resources Protection Act: A New Application in the Private Property Context, 44 CATH. U. L. REV.
599, 607 (1995); Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the
United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 629 (1995) (noting that ARPA applies only to excavation activity); David G.
Bercaw, Requiem for Indiana Jones: Federal Law, Native Americans, and the Treasure Hunters, 30 TULSA L.J. 213,
219 (1994); Jay M. Zitter, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Archaeological Resources Protection Act of
1979, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470aa to 470mm, 184 A.L.R. FED. 139, §2[a]; Iraola, supra, note 8 at 222-223; Francis P.
McMannamon, Cultural Resources and Protection Under United States Law, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 247, 265-266
(2001).
33
See generally, 16 U.S.C. 470aa through 470mm.
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A.

ARPA’s Congressional History
Unlike the numerous hearings and reports that preceded the passage of the Native

American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) in 1990,34 Congress only
conducted one hearing on ARPA35 and only produced two reports on the legislation.36 Although
the House of Representatives version of ARPA37 was ultimately adopted and signed by President
Carter as P.L. 96-95, the Senate version38 is virtually identical. This is important because the
Senate hearing on S. 490 was the only hearing on ARPA. The House of Representatives did not
hold hearings on its version of ARPA. However, the House did issue a report that accompanied
H.R. 1825.39 That report, along with the S. 490 report, is included in this analysis. Therefore,
much of the historical analysis of ARPA herein is based on a review of the congressional

34

See generally Protection of Native American Graves and the Repatriation of Human Remains and Sacred
Objects: Hearings on H.R. 1381, H.R. 1646, and H.R. 5237 Before the H.R. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
101st Cong. (1990); Native American Grave and Burial Protection Act (Repatriation); Native American Repatriation
of Cultural Patrimony Act; and Heard Museum Report: Hearings on S. 1021 and S. 1980 Before the Senate Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 101st Cong. (1990); National Memorial Museum of the American Indian: Hearings on S. 978
Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs and Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 101st Cong. (1989);
Establishment of the National Museum of the Native American: Hearings on H.R. 2668 Before the H.R. Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, H. R. Comm. on House Administration, and H.R. Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 101st Cong. (1989); Native American Museum Claims Commission Act: Hearings on S. 187 Before
the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. (1988); National American Indian Museum Act (Part 2):
Hearings on S. 1722 and 1723 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs and Senate Comm. on Rules and
Administration, 100th Cong. (1987); National American Indian Museum Act (Part I): Hearings S. 1722 and S. 1723
Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs and Senate Comm. on Rules and Administration, 100th Cong. (1987);
Native American Cultural Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 187 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th
Cong. (1987); H.R. REP. NO. 101-877 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-473 (1990); H.R. REP. NO. 101-340, pt. 2 (1989);
H.R. REP. NO. 101-340, pt. 1 (1989); S. REP. NO. 101-143 (1989); S. REP. NO. 100-601 (1988); S. REP. NO. 100-494
(1988). This legislative history includes the history of NAGPRA and the National Museum of the American Indian
Act (NMAIA). Inclusion of the history of the NMAIA is due to the fact that many of the provisions of NAGPRA
are modeled on this earlier law. See S. REP. NO. 101-473, at 3.
35
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979; and the Frederick Law Olmstead National
Historic Site: Hearings on S. 490 and S. 495, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Parks, Recreation, and Renewable
Resources, 96th Cong. (1979) (“Senate hearing”).
36
S. REP. NO. 96-179; H.R. REP. NO. 96-311.
37
H.R. 1825, 96th Cong. (1979).
38
S. 490, 96th Cong. (1979).
39
H.R. REP. NO. 96-311.
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documents associated with the virtually identical Senate companion bill, S. 490, with some
discussion of the final version deriving from an examination of the House report on H.R. 1825.
It is clear, beyond question, in the congressional materials, that ARPA was created for
one purpose: To stem the tide of illegal excavation and the sale of artifacts from federal and
Indian lands.40 The purpose of ARPA is carried out by “providing penalties commensurate with
the value of the resource damaged or removed from public lands or Indian lands without a
permit.

In addition, information concerning the nature and location of any archaeological

resource which might create a risk to such resource would be exempt under the Freedom of
Information Act.”41 The congressional history provides a precise explanation of the intent of
ARPA: “The bill provides for the protection of archaeological resources on public and Indian
lands by prohibiting unauthorized removal or sale of antiquities and outlines a means of
assessing penalties to be imposed on violators.”42 The fact that this statement says nothing about
limiting scientific study and focuses instead entirely on the threats of illicit excavation and trade
clearly leaves little room for an interpretation that ARPA was ever intended to limit or restrict
scientific investigation of archaeological resources.
Indeed, the author of the Senate version of ARPA, Senator Domenici, commented that
the problem intended to be addressed by the law was looters.43 Much of the realization of this
purpose was to be accomplished by shoring up the then-faltering Antiquities Act of 1906.44 This
purpose is also supported in H. Rep. No. 96-311, which cites the Ninth Circuit decision in U.S. v.

40

S. REP. NO. 96-179 at 1,6; H.R. REP. NO. 96-311 at 7, 13.
S. REP. NO. 96-179 at 6.
42
H.R. REP. NO. 96-311 at 13.
43
Senate hearing, supra, note 35 at 40.
44
Id.
41
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Diaz,45 which rendered a portion of the Antiquities Act unconstitutional in that circuit,46
“coupled with the dramatic rise in recent years of illegal excavations on public lands and Indian
lands for private gain...”47
There is no mention of limiting scientific research in the ARPA legislative history. Any
“preservation” that may be intended by ARPA is a duty to preserve archaeological sites and
materials from looting and sale so that they may be available for scientific study. This is the only
logical purpose of ARPA that can be discerned from the congressional history. Accordingly, in
case it is not already obvious, the Government’s duty to preserve, according to the congressional
history of ARPA, is a duty to protect resources from looters so that those resources will be
available for scientific study.48 This conclusion is supported by H. Rep. No. 96-311, which
states that “[i]t is the recognition of the importance of the integrity of the archaeological site and
the context in which archaeological resources are found that the Committee feels should guide
land managers in their protection and enforcement efforts.”49

This quote highlights the

importance of archaeological site integrity and context, factors that are substantially relevant for
the purposes of scientific analysis.50

45

499 F.2d 113 (C.A. Ariz. 1974).
This case involved the criminal trial of a man who had taken some Apache face masks that were made by
a medicine man in 1969 or 1970 from a cave on the San Carlos Indian Reservation in Arizona. Writing for the
Ninth Circuit, Judge Merrill found the absence of a definition of the term “object of antiquity” in the Antiquities Act
to render the law unconstitutionally vague and in violation of the defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 115. The
court noted that “[o]ne must be able to know, with reasonable certainty, when he has happened on an area forbidden
to his pick and shovel and what objects he must leave as he has found them.” Id. at 114. This language
substantially undermined the utility of the Antiquities Act for future criminal prosecutions.
47
H.R. REP. NO. 96-311 at 7. See also, Ades, supra, note 32 at 601.
48
See Senate hearing, supra, note 35 at 1, 40, 51-2, 85-8; S. REP. NO. 96-179 at 7, 13.
49
H.R. REP. NO. 96-311 at 8.
50
Id. at 9.
46
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Based upon the foregoing analysis, there is no stated or implied purpose in ARPA or its
congressional history that the legislation was intended to thwart scientific study of archaeological
materials. No issues were raised related to limiting research that would or could be done under
ARPA during the legislative process.51 It is apparent from the lack of discussion of this issue
when the legislation was being considered by Congress that the interference of this legislation
with science was not even on the radar screen. Indeed, based on the absence of any discussion of
how ARPA might impact scientific study in the 1979 hearings suggests that any attempts to limit
study of archaeological materials would represent a post-hoc alteration of the purpose of the
statute to suit political or other ends. If such action is done by an executive agency charged with
enforcing ARPA, this would raise significant separation of powers questions.
ARPA is devoid of any explicit or implicit intention to limit scientific analysis. The
congressional history of ARPA is devoid of any explicit or implicit intention to limit scientific
analysis.

The absence of any mention of limiting scientific analysis in the statute and

congressional history would render any subsequent agency attempts to limit post-excavation
analyses of archaeological materials beyond the scope of the authorization granted to the relevant
agencies by Congress.
B.

ARPA in the U.S. Code
As has already been discussed, clearly, on the face of the law, ARPA does not contain

any provisions that mention the limiting of scientific study of materials excavated or removed

51

Senate hearing, supra, note 35 at 41-3; H.R. REP. NO. 96-311 at 23-5.
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pursuant to an ARPA permit.52 Although it is clear that there is no overt provision in ARPA that
can allow the government to limit subsequent scientific study of excavated materials, there are a
few portions of the law that may be facially confusing to some on this issue.

However,

considered in light of the congressional history, common sense, and logical legislative
construction, the ambiguities of these provisions are easily demystified.
Title 16, Section 470aa(b) states that “[t]he purpose of this chapter is to secure for the
present and future benefit of the American people, the protection of archaeological resources and
sites on public lands and Indian lands.” The “protection” purpose referred to in 16 U.S.C.
470aa(b), based on the clear concerns voiced in the congressional history, refers to protecting the
archaeological record from looters in order that materials may be saved for scientific analysis
that benefits the general public’s understanding of the nation’s past.53
All of the permitting provisions of ARPA are contained in 16 U.S.C. 470cc. This section
covers, in pertinent part, such topics as who can apply for a permit, notification to tribes (when
appropriate), and terms and conditions of the permit. There is no language in this section that
provides for any limit on post-excavation analyses of materials. Indeed, an in pari materia
analysis of this section would limit any terms and conditions to be imposed under 470cc(d) to
such terms and conditions necessary for excavation and removal of these materials. This is due
to the simple reality that the only permitting provisions of ARPA appear in the “Excavation and
Removal” section of the law.54 Thus, it would be a quantum leap of legal interpretation, in the
absence of clear language, to suggest, and much less to assert, that ARPA’s permitting
52
53

See generally, 16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq.
See Senate hearings, supra, note 35 at 40; S. REP. NO. 96-179 at 1,6; H.R. REP. NO. 96-311 at 7, 13.
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provisions provide any authority to executive agencies to limit post-excavation analysis of
archaeological materials. Further, in light of the previously discussed “protection” clause of
ARPA, an argument that the Government can limit such studies contradicts the purpose of the
law: To protect archaeological materials for scientific study, not from scientific study.
Another relevant section to this analysis of ARPA is 16 U.S.C. 470dd. This section
covers the custody of archaeological resources that are excavated or removed pursuant to an
ARPA permit. This section charges the Secretary of the Interior with the duty to, among other
things, promulgate regulations for “...the ultimate disposition of [archaeological] resources
removed pursuant to” the Antiquities Act55 and the Reservoir Salvage Act (RSA)56 as well as
those excavated and removed pursuant to ARPA.57 One confusing term in this section, both as it
appears in the quote above and the one below, is the term “disposition.” The other potentially
confusing language in this section reads “such regulations shall govern the disposition of
archaeological resources removed from public lands...pursuant to this chapter.”58 In this latter
portion of 16 U.S.C. 470dd, the term “disposition” is a bit ambiguous. However, if this use is
interpreted in light of the other use of “disposition” in this section,59 it is apparent that both of
these terms are intended to control the creation of regulations on the matter of what institution
ultimately becomes the repository for archaeological materials excavated or removed pursuant to
ARPA, the Antiquities Act, or the RSA. Again, this intent is bolstered when the terms are
examined from an in pari materia perspective. Under such an analysis, the placement of these
54

16 U.S.C. 470cc.
16 U.S.C. 431-433.
56
16 U.S.C. 469-469c.
57
16 U.S.C. 470dd(2).
58
16 U.S.C. 470dd (emphasis added).
55
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provisions in a section of ARPA titled “Custody of archaeological resources” suggests that the
provisions contained therein will govern where collected materials will repose. There is nothing
at all in this section that suggests the imposition of limits on scientific analyses of the collected
materials.
The remainder of ARPA60 deals with matters not related to scientific study, such as
criminal61 and civil penalties62 and privacy of the site location,63 among other things. As these
matters are irrelevant to the current inquiry, there is no discussion of them herein.
In light of the congressional history of ARPA and the relevant United States Code
provisions, it is abundantly apparent that ARPA is much more concerned with in situ
64

preservation of archaeological materials and their protection from “uncontrolled excavation and

pillage”65 due to their “commercial attractiveness”66 rather than the limitation of scientific
research. The language that states that ARPA “is to secure, for the present and future benefit of
the American people, the protection of archaeological resources and their sites” is directed
specifically at protecting these resources from commercial exploitation and not scientific
research projects that are conducted within the confines of currently accepted scientific methods.
Indeed, it is important to note, once again, that there are no restrictions in ARPA on any type of
scientific research at all.
59

IE., “ultimate disposition” in 16 U.S.C. 470dd(2).
16 U.S.C. 470ee through 470mm.
61
16 U.S.C. 470ee.
62
16 U.S.C. 470ff.
63
16 U.S.C. 470hh.
64
In situ is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “in its (original) place; in position.” In
archaeological contexts, the term refers to archaeological materials being in their original location, usually in the
ground.
65
16 U.S.C. 470aa(a)(3).
66
16 U.S.C. 470aa(a)(2).
60
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C.

ARPA in the Code of Federal Regulations
Although ARPA regulations exist in, among other places, 36 CFR §§ 79 et seq., this set

of regulations derives its authority from several different laws. ARPA shares the 36 CFR §§ 79
et seq. regulations with rules promulgated under the authority of the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966 (“NHPA”),67 the Antiquities Act of 1906 (“the Antiquities Act”), and
the Reservoir Salvage Act (“RSA”).68 This shared nature of at least some of these regulations is
supported by the Department of the Interior in the following statement in a “reader friendly”
recapitulation of the curation regulations in 36 CFR § 79 thus, “[i]ssuance of this rule fulfills the
Secretary of the Interior’s obligations under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and
the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 to issue such regulations.”69 Through each
of these laws, Congress has provided various limits on the authority of the relevant agency heads
for the promulgation of the laws’ respective regulations. What this means is that, though ARPA
and NHPA may share the same real estate in the Code of Federal Regulations, the authority
granted by the organic legislation may preclude the application of certain portions of those
regulations to certain scenarios. For instance, Judge Jelderks limited the scientists’ study of the
Kennewick Man remains to the restrictions with respect to scientific study under ARPA.70 Thus,
only the ARPA-authorized regulations in the shared CFR regulations would apply to Kennewick
Man. The blanket application of all of 36 CFR §§ 79 et seq., without regard to the specific

67

16 U.S.C. 470.
36 CFR § 79.2.
69
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), 36 CFR PART 79: CURATION OF FEDERALLY-OWNED AND
ADMINISTERED ARCHAEOLOGICAL COLLECTIONS (DOI 1991 at 1).
70
Bonnichsen, supra, note 3 at 1167.
68
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organic statutes from which the regulations derive is an overextension of the application of
ARPA to the study of archaeological materials.
An examination of all relevant CFR sections is warranted, along with an examination of
the relevant parts of the various organic statutes that share those CFR regulations in order to
identify those portions of the CFR that are authorized by ARPA and those that derive from other
statutes. The regulations that remain, those specifically authorized by ARPA, are the ones that
can be applied to the question of the limits of scientific study under ARPA. The application of
the regulations deriving solely from any other statute to ARPA situations would be an
unauthorized expansion of ARPA beyond the authority granted to the relevant agencies by
Congress.
The CFR identifies four specific areas of the Code that contain regulations implemented
pursuant to ARPA: 18 CFR § 1312, 32 CFR § 229, 36 CFR § 296, and 43 CFR § 7.71 Although
there are other portions of the CFR (e.g., 36 CFR 79.1 et seq.) that it would seem reasonable to
apply to ARPA-collected materials,72 such an application of these regulations is expressly
avoided in 36 CFR 79.3(d). This section states, in pertinent part, that “[c]ollections that are
excavated or removed pursuant to the Archaeological Resources Protection Act...remain subject
to that Act, the Act’s implementing rules (43 CFR part 7, 36 CFR part 216, 18 CFR part 1312,
and 32 CFR part 229), and the terms and conditions of the pertinent Archaeological Resources
Protection Act permit or other approval.”73 This avoidance of the remainder of 36 CFR §§ 79.1
et seq., when dealing with ARPA, is also supported by the inconsistencies between the aims of
71
72

36 CFR § 79.3(d).
See e.g., 36 CFR §§ 79.5, 79.10(a), 79.10(b), 79.10(d)(1), 79.10(d)(5).
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the rest of Part 79 and the purposes embodied in ARPA itself. It must not be forgotten that, as
demonstrated above, ARPA was created to protect archaeological materials from looting and
illicit trade, not from scientific analysis. Any attempt at such a restriction in the regulations
under the guise of ARPA authority would be an unreasonable and unapproved expansion of
Congress’ delegated rulemaking power under ARPA. More specifically to the point of the cited
regulations, ARPA was also not created to cover the curation of archaeological materials once
they leave the ground except for situations dealing with the transfer of materials from one
institution to another.74
1.

Possible Confusion: 36 CFR § 79.10
Despite the fact that 36 CFR § 79.3 excepts materials governed by ARPA from the

regulations of the remainder of 36 CFR §§ 79.1 et seq., an examination of some of the
regulations in part 79 is warranted in order to address the question of ARPA authority in these
regulations specifically. The reason for this is because some of these regulations relate to
collections use and other concepts that would seem to implicate an ARPA inquiry.

The

regulations of interest are 36 CFR § 79.10 and 36 CFR § 79.10(d). Both of these sections are
encompassed in the overall review of 36 CFR § 79.10 that follows.
Section 79.10 is entitled “Use of collections.” The title of this section is indicative, from
the start, that its authority does not derive from ARPA. There is no provision in ARPA that
dictates anything on the use of collections. Section 79.10(a) speaks to ensuring that collections
are made available for “scientific, educational and religious uses, subject to such terms and
73
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conditions as are necessary to protect and preserve the” collection. There is no doubt that the
cause of this part of section 79.10 is noble; however, its authority does not derive from ARPA.
Although 16 U.S.C. 470dd (part of ARPA) directs the Secretary of the Interior to create
regulations concerning the ultimate disposition of materials, there is no indication in that section
or in the congressional history that this attempt to foster better communication between
institutions was intended to provide authority for regulating the use of collections.
Irrespective of the fact that section 79.10(a) finds no authority for its existence in ARPA,
if such regulations were to be applied to an ARPA-permitted activity, even though there is no
reason to believe that they should be so applied, then section 79.10(b) requires that collections
“shall be made available to qualified professionals for study.”75 Thus, if a court ultimately
decides to apply section 79.10(a) to archaeological materials under some perceived ARPA
authority, then 79.10(b) mandates (by virtue of the word “shall”) that these materials be made
available for study. However, as discussed above, no court should logically ever have to address
this issue as the plain language of the statute and regulations dictate against the application of
section 79.10 to materials collected pursuant to ARPA permits. Additionally, there are no
restrictions in 79.10(b) as to what types of studies can be performed on archaeological materials.
However, again, the inquiry should not go this far, as there is no statutory authority in ARPA for
any of section 79.10.
Section 79.10(c) is not relevant to this inquiry, as it pertains to religious uses. Section
79.10(d), however, does derive its authority from ARPA. This section contains the regulations

74
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16 U.S.C. 470dd.
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related to the protection of archaeological site information, promulgated under authority from 16
U.S.C. 470hh. However, none of these site protection regulations are relevant to the question of
the scientific study of archaeological materials.
Section 79.10(e), though not relevant to the current issue of scientific study, does derive
its authority from ARPA. This section provides regulations for the transfer of materials as
covered by 16 U.S.C. 470dd. Indeed, because of the absence of language in ARPA related to
preservation, the authority for the majority of the provisions in section 79.10 appear to derive
from other statutes that contribute to this portion of the CFR.76 Thus, under the authority of
ARPA, there is no statutory basis for restricting or controlling, in any manner, the types of
scientific research that is ultimately performed on archaeological materials excavated pursuant to
an ARPA permit.
There is one minor exception to this absence of limitations to the conduct of scientific
research under ARPA: The research can be limited by the express terms of the ARPA permit that
is issued for the excavation of the materials.77 That being said, there are seldom such limitations
or restrictions imposed by ARPA permits.78
The remainder of the CFR provisions that derive their authority from ARPA follow the
general intentions and mandates of Congress for ARPA: The protection of archaeological
materials and sites from looting. This purpose is accomplished through the issuance of permits
for excavation to qualified individuals.79 Although 36 CFR 296.1(a) charges Federal Land
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These other statutes are the NHPA, the RSA, and the Antiquities Act.
36 CFR § 79.3(d). See also the discussion in and related to footnote 116, infra.
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See e.g., ARPA permit number DACW68-4-96-40, issued 7/30/96. See also the discussion in and related
to footnote 116, infra.
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Managers with the protection of archaeological resources through, among other methods,
“provisions for the preservation of archaeological resource collections and data...” this provision,
which appears throughout the CFR in the ARPA-authorized regulations,80 appears to be aimed at
the maintenance of archaeological materials through the permitting of excavations in the field.
Such a purpose is supported by ARPA itself. There is no authority granted to the Secretary of
the Interior or to Federal Land Managers in ARPA to support actual preservation, only protection
and curation.81 If, in the alternative, this regulation is aimed at preserving materials postexcavation, then the regulation’s authority does not derive from ARPA. In that case, it could
either be an ultra vires regulation purportedly promulgated under ARPA authority or it could
derive from other legislation that share CFR regulations with ARPA and thus is not applicable to
ARPA-permitted activities. The remainder of the ARPA-related regulations in the CFR are
limited to permitting for excavation and removal as well as criminal and civil violations of
ARPA and are thus not relevant to the issue of scientific study of archaeological materials.82 It
should be noted, in light of the purposes of ARPA identified herein, that any attempt to apply
non-ARPA-authorized regulations to an ARPA situation would violate the authority delegated to
the agencies under the law and would be unconstitutional.
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E.g., 32 CFR § 229.1(a) and 43 CFR § 7.1(a).
See generally, 16 U.S.C. 470aa et seq. This is further supported by the promulgation authority of 36
CFR § 296.2 that charges the agencies to create rules consistent with ARPA. Such consistency provisions would
mean that the addition of preservation rules to the regulations, when not mentioned in the organic ARPA legislation,
and when there is no other authority for the creation of the regulations, is an extension of the scope of ARPA beyond
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2.

Other Statutes that Share the Same CFR Regulations
If, as mentioned above, the authority for preservation provisions in the ARPA area of the

CFR are absent from ARPA, where do these provisions come from? Do the preservation
regulations in the CFR provisions shared by ARPA and several other statutes derive from the
authority granted to the agencies by Congress under these other statutes or are these regulations
completely without statutory support? Though these questions do not bear directly on the current
debate as to the extent of scientific study allowed under ARPA, they may provide some insight
into the misplaced authority cited in sources such as Bonnichsen83 and Bruning84 and are
interesting from a statutory construction perspective.
a.

National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
Two sections of the NHPA are relevant to the analysis of the source of the preservation

authority in 36 CFR 79.10: 16 U.S.C. 470a(7)(A) and 16 U.S.C. 470h-2(a)(1).

Section

470a(7)(A) bolsters the fact that the “curation” provisions of ARPA and the NHPA refers to
“institution[s] with adequate long-term curatorial capabilities”85 and does not refer to curation as
a means of restricting scientific study. It is possible that the preservation provisions in the shared
ARPA/NHPA CFR regulations derive from 16 U.S.C. 470h-2(a)(1). This section authorizes
“any preservation, as may be needed to carry out this section.”86 This preservation is to support
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Act, Scientific Study, and Kennewick Man, 71(3) AMERICAN ANTIQUITY 501, 513, 515 (2006). In this recent article,
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the preservation of historic properties “owned or controlled by [the] agency.”87 This provision of
the U.S.C. does not restrict the extent to which the preservation can reach and could thus be
construed in the regulations as allowing for a limitation of scientific study in the interests of
preservation. However, the clear intent of the provision cannot be appreciated in the absence of
considering the NHPA congressional history. Because this NHPA provision does not affect
ARPA, such a consideration is not undertaken here, as it is outside of the scope of this analysis.
More likely than the above provisions as a source for the preservation provisions of the
shared CFR regulations is the overarching provision of the U.S.C. that applies to the NHPA and
the RSA. This is 16 U.S.C. 462, which is part of Subchapter I of Chapter IA of Title 16 of the
U.S.C. This section states, in pertinent part, that “The Secretary of the Interior..., through the
National Park Service, shall have the following powers and perform the following duties and
functions:
(a) Secure, collate, and preserve drawings, plans, photographs, and other data
of...archaeological sites...
***
(f) Restore, reconstruct, rehabilitate, preserve, and maintain historic or prehistoric
sites, buildings, objects, and properties of national historical or archaeological
significance...”88
Part (f) of 16 U.S.C. 462 appears to provide potential authority for the Secretary of the
Interior to promulgate rules to preserve objects of archaeological significance. It is possible that
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this provision is the source of the preservation language in the shared CFR regulations.
Although 16 U.S.C. 467 states that the provisions of 16 U.S.C. 461 through 467 “shall
control if any of them are in conflict with any other Act or Acts relating to the same subject
matter,”89 this is not a problem with respect to ARPA. There is no actual conflict between the
NHPA/RSA and ARPA. Rather, they are complimentary laws that serve a divergent purpose.
The divergent purpose is the fact that NHPA and RSA essentially exist to protect our nation’s
cultural heritage from destruction due to sprawl,90 while ARPA exists to stem the tide of the
looting of archaeological sites and the illicit trade in archaeological materials.91 Because there is
no conflict, there is nothing in ARPA for the NHPA/RSA’s preservation provisions to trump via
16 U.S.C. 467.
b.

The Reservoir Salvage Act (RSA)
The RSA, as stated above, shares the same CFR regulations with ARPA. However,

because its purpose is “to further the policy set forth in”92 the NHPA, it really does not add any
new provisions to the preservation debate. Like ARPA, the RSA is largely aimed at protecting in
situ archaeological and historical sites from destruction due to construction activities. Because
of its “preservation in the field” approach, it provides no more guidance on potential restrictions
on scientific research than has already been reviewed under the NHPA.
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c.

The Antiquities Act of 1906
The Antiquities Act of 1906 occupies only a small amount of real estate in the United

States Code, 16 U.S.C. 431-433, but the impact of this law has been substantial. From its
inception in 1906 until ARPA was passed in 1979, the Antiquities Act was the dominant
enforcement law for the protection of archaeological sites on federal lands in the United States.93
As an initial matter, there is no clear authority in the statutory language of the Antiquities
Act that could be construed as the basis for the imposition of any restraints on the scientific study
of archaeological materials. Section 431 of Title 16 outlines the President’s power under the
Antiquities Act. This section grants power to the President to declare “historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are
situated upon lands owned or controlled” by the United States as national monuments.94 The
practical implication of Section 431 is realized in Section 432. This section grants authority to
the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and the Army to issue excavation and artifact collection
permits to qualified individuals to conduct such activity on Antiquities Act-protected lands.95
The only caveat to securing such permits, assuming that the qualified individual requirement has
been met, is that “the examinations, excavations, or gatherings are undertaken for the benefit of
reputable museums, universities, colleges, or other recognized scientific or educational
institutions, with a view to increasing the knowledge of such objects, and that the gatherings
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shall be made for permanent preservation in public museums.”96 Section 433 provides for
criminal and civil sanctions for violations of the Antiquities Act.
From the language of 16 U.S.C. 432, it is clear that no authority was granted to any
agency to restrict or limit legitimate scientific study of archaeological materials. Indeed, the
Antiquities Act clearly promotes the scientific study of archaeological materials in Section 432
by noting that sites and artifacts covered by the Act are to be preserved “with a view to
increasing the knowledge of such objects.”97 Thus, it is clear that whatever language may exist
in the CFR to limit scientific study, that this language does not find its origins or authority in the
Antiquities Act of 1906.
3.

Relevance of the Presence of Other Statutes Sharing ARPA’s CFR Provisions
Because the portions of the CFR in which ARPA’s regulations are found also contain

regulations promulgated under the authority granted to agencies by Congress through other laws,
it is necessary to identify what regulations are authorized by what laws in order to parse out what
the Government can and cannot restrict under such a charge as the one in Bonnichsen: “subject to
the type of reasonable terms and conditions that normally apply to studies of archaeological
resources under ARPA.”98 The previous examinations of the relevant laws are summarized here
to clearly address the basis for any authority to restrict scientific activity on the part of the
Government.
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a.

Where does authority for restricting scientific analyses come from in the CFR?
The short answer to that question, as evidenced by the preceding analysis, is that the

authority to restrict or limit scientific research on archaeological materials does not come from
ARPA. ARPA is directed at the protection of in situ archaeological materials and sites99 as well
as stemming the tide of illicit excavations and trade of artifacts.100 There are no provisions under
ARPA, explicit or implicit, that provide any authority to limit scientific analyses on
archaeological materials excavated pursuant to an ARPA permit.101
The authority to preserve archaeological materials post-excavation appears to derive from
Chapter IA of Title 16 of the U.S.C., including NHPA. The significance of Chapter IA being the
basis for the preservation provisions of the CFR is that ARPA is not included in that part of the
U.S.C. and thus there is no authority to restrict scientific analyses for materials removed under
ARPA. This is illustrated by an in pari materia analysis of the organization of the relevant parts
of the U.S.C.
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See e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-791 at 2. This later source that contains commentary on the purpose of
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time to do it. Instead, the House report reaffirms that the purpose of ARPA was the protection of archaeological
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the scope of scientific study us the requirement of professional qualifications to obtain permits, discussed more
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b.

An In Pari Materia Analysis of the U.S.C. as it Relates to CFR Authority to Limit
Study
Perhaps the most telling means of understanding the relationship of ARPA to the other

provisions of the USC that relate to archaeological and historic resources is the arrangement of
the Code. This arrangement illustrates the interaction of these statutes and how their authority
plays out in the CFR. As stated supra, the most likely source of the preservation language, as it
relates to archaeological materials that have already been excavated or removed, derives from
Subchapter I of Chapter IA of Title 16 in the USC (NHPA). The USC, as it applies to the issues
discussed herein is organized thus:
Title 16
Chapter I. National Parks, Military Parks, Monuments and Seashores
Chapter I.A. Historic Sites, Buildings, Objects, and Antiquities
Subchapter I. General provisions (§§461-468e)
Subchapter I. Reservoir Salvage Act (§§469-469c-2)
Subchapter II. National Historic Preservation Act (§§470-470x-6)
Chapter I.B. Archaeological Resources Protection Act (§§470aa-470mm)
The purpose of the preceding outline is to demonstrate that, within the USC, ARPA is situated in
an entirely separate portion of the Code (i.e., Chapter I.B.) from the provisions that contain all of
the preservation provisions in the CFR. Due to the substantial separation of these provisions, it
is unreasonable to believe that the provisions of Chapter I.A. would represent authority to extend
the preservation provisions to the divergent purposes of Chapter I.B.
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D. Has ARPA Ever Been Used in this Manner Before?
A review of all of the reported case law that has cited ARPA demonstrates that the law
and its attendant regulations have never been used to limit or restrict scientific research in the
past. Despite the fact that no such use of ARPA has ever been made, the case law does provide
some interesting insight from impartial interpreters of the law. Again, though these cases are
somewhat informative as to others’ impressions of Congress’ intent for ARPA, none of them are
directly on-point as to the issues addressed in this review.
In Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,102 Judge Atkins stated
that “[t]he enactment of ARPA indicates a continuing interest by the government in protecting its
archaeological resources from commercial excavation and pillage. … It also requires that any
objects taken from archaeological sites be preserved in a museum or other suitable institution for
the public benefit.”103 Judge Atkins cites 16 U.S.C. 470cc(b)(3) for authority for this statement.
Based upon the context of the case, one dealing with the looting of a historic shipwreck, and the
above analysis of ARPA, it is apparent that the “preservation” referred to in Klein refers to
maintenance of archaeological materials in an institution for future scientific examination. The
real key to the interpretation of ARPA that derives from Klein is the fact that Judge Atkins found
that ARPA was enacted to protect archaeological resources “from commercial excavation and
pillage.”104 The protection of archaeological resources from pillage as the intent of ARPA was
also echoed by the Eleventh Circuit in the appeal of Klein.105
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In Attakai v. U.S.,106 Judge Carroll, for the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona, commented that “[t]he Archaeological Resources Protection Act…sets up a permitting
system to regulate excavation and removal of ‘archaeological resources’ from public and Indian
lands.”107 The telling aspect of this case is what ARPA is not stated to apply to. There is no
discussion that suggests that ARPA was intended for any other purpose than to permit excavation
and removal of archaeological resources.
In Fein v. Peltier, Chief Judge Moore, writing for the U.S. District Court for the District
of the Virgin Islands, echoed that the purpose of ARPA is to protect “archaeological resources
and sites which are on public lands…,”108 applying the law to a construction project that
threatened a historic archaeological site. The law was not used or suggested to be used in any
manner to limit the scientific study of materials excavated from the site.
Indeed, Judge Jones, writing for the Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. Shivers,109 clearly stated that
“ARPA was enacted by Congress to protect ‘archaeological resources’ found on public lands and
to promote study and evaluation of these resources.”110 Judge Jones goes one step further to
comment that “ARPA is concerned with protecting the integrity of archaeological sites…” by
mandating certain qualifications for excavators prior to the issue of permits and through
promoting in situ preservation of archaeological sites.111
Finally, in U.S. v. Gerber, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, stated that
ARPA “is given over to the regulation, in the form of civil and criminal penalties, permit
106
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requirements, forfeiture provisions, and other regulatory devices, of archaeological resources on
federal and Indian lands.”112 There is no mention of ARPA being intended to apply to limiting
studies over the materials that have been removed from federal or Indian lands.
Although none of the cases that cite ARPA directly consider the issue of scientific study,
there is some useful information that can be derived from them. The most notable component of
all of these cases and what is absent from the reviews of the purposes and uses of ARPA is the
fact that none of them find any portion of the law to apply to anything more than the protection
of archaeological resources from looting and unauthorized excavation. There is no extension of
ARPA, even in these unbiased reviews of the law, to a law that limits or restricts, or indeed has
anything to do with, scientific analysis once resources have been removed from their in situ
locations. The one inclination towards anything related to scientific study in this line of cases
came from Judge Jones’ statement that the entire purpose of the protection provisions in ARPA
is “to promote study and evaluation of [archaeological] resources.”113 This assessment of ARPA
is consistent with the congressional intent as well as the statute and its attendant regulations that
archaeological resources must be protected from looters for analysis using currently accepted
scientific standards or in situ preservation.
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V.

Discussion

A.

ARPA Does Not Provide for the Limitation of Scientific Study
Based upon the analysis of ARPA’s congressional history, the statute, the regulations,

and the case law, there is no existing authority, under ARPA, to limit or restrict scientific
analyses of archaeological resources. As has been belabored at length above, ARPA was created
to compensate for the shortcomings of the Antiquities Act of 1906 to stem the tide of the looting
of archaeological sites on federal land and Indian land and the illicit sale of the stolen resources.
There is absolutely no indication, in any of ARPA’s record, whether implicit or explicit,
that the law was ever intended to interfere with the scientific study of this nation’s past. Despite
the vague language and a reference to “preservation” in ARPA, the presence of the term was not
intended to restrict analysis under ARPA, but rather to ensure that a proper repository for
resources removed pursuant to an ARPA permit is present before such removal.
Although some of the regulations in the CFR are shared by several laws, not all of these
laws apply to all scenarios. However, though some of the regulations that ARPA shares with
such laws as the NHPA and the RSA may contain provisions for limiting some measure of study,
such limitations are not authorized by Congress under ARPA.

Due to the fact that these

regulations are shared by several laws, it is easy to understand how a less-than-complete analysis
of the congressional intent for and organizational structure of ARPA could lead to a supposition
that authority does exist to limit scientific study, but this complete analysis has demonstrated that
assertion to be without merit.
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B.

A Chevron/Vogel Analysis of Regulations Under Purported ARPA Authority to
Limit Scientific Study Do Not Pass Muster
As noted in Part II, supra, there is no language in ARPA or its authorized regulations that

explicitly limits scientific study of archaeological materials nor has there been any clear attempt
by any agency to promulgate regulations purporting to confer such authority. The analysis
herein, which examines whether some implicit authority exists in ARPA, exists solely to test the
statement of Judge Jelderks in Bonnichsen114 and to assess the agencies’ powers to so regulate.
A Chevron analysis of regulatory authority begins with the following question: Has
Congress has directly spoken to the issue at hand?115 The answer to this question, as has been
belabored herein, is “no.” The other component of this inquiry, which is triggered by an answer
in the negative to the above question is whether the agency’s action is based on a permissible
construction of ARPA.116

Because, as discussed fully, supra, the purpose of ARPA is to

preserve archaeological materials for study and not to protect them from study, this necessarily
leads to a conclusion that a regulation to limit scientific study would not be based on a
permissible construction of ARPA.117 Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is clear that, under
the language of ARPA as it has existed since 1979, any attempt, whether by promulgating a
regulation or by purporting to act pursuant to an implicit grant of authority in the law or its
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regulations, by an executive agency to limit scientific study under ARPA would not pass muster
as a valid agency activity under a Chevron analysis.
As if a failure to pass muster under a Chevron analysis is not enough, an attempt by an
executive agency to limit scientific study pursuant to some perceived authority under ARPA
would similarly fail under a Vogel analysis. The Vogel decision closely examines Congress’
intent for passing legislation to determine the reasonableness of agency actions.118 This analysis
begins with the question of whether or not an agency is due deference for its actions.119
Under Vogel, in order for an agency to gain deference to its actions from a court, it must
be clear that the action or regulation at issue implements the congressional mandate of the
organic law.120 ARPA was enacted by the 96th Congress to stem the tide of illicit excavations
and the illicit trade in archaeological artifacts, nothing more. As is clear from the analysis
herein, if any part of ARPA relates to scientific study, it would have to be said that the law
supports the preservation of archaeological materials for study in order to enhance the public’s
understanding of human history in the United States, not to limit that study. Thus, any regulation
or action by an agency to limit the scientific study of archaeological materials is in clear
contravention of the mandate of Congress under ARPA and should not be afforded any deference
by a court.
Another part of the Vogel analysis examines the law at issue through its legislative
history, an in pari materia analysis, and for its harmony with the congressional purpose to
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determine whether an agency has the authority to act as it has.121 Based on the clear evidence
that there is no support for the limitation of scientific study in ARPA’s legislative history or from
an in pari materia perspective, it must be concluded that no such authority exists. It would be
difficult to argue that a regulation or a ruling by an agency to limit scientific study is in harmony
with a law that is intended to preserve archaeological materials for such study. Thus, such
agency actions must fail this part of the Vogel analysis as well.
Finally, the Vogel Court noted that a regulation need not be sustained merely because it is
not technically inconsistent with the organic legislation if it is fundamentally at odds with the
congressional design for the law.122 Without seeing an actual regulation that limits scientific
study, it is impossible to know if it would be technically inconsistent with ARPA or not.
However, limiting scientific study is clearly at odds with the congressional design to make
archaeological materials available for study. Clearly, such a regulation should not be sustained
due to its contravention with Congress’ intent for ARPA.
VI.

Conclusions
It is apparent from the cases cited herein as well as others that ARPA has been successful

in the prosecution of looters of archaeological sites on federal and Indian lands. It has served
this purpose fairly well. Even if it has not stemmed the tide of looting and the illicit trade in
antiquities, it has provided prosecutors with a useful tool in their arsenal to bring those who
attempt to profit from the pillaging of the nation’s past by bringing them to justice. In this
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Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
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regard, ARPA serves its purpose to the limit feasible under strained governmental budgets and in
an area where it is difficult to catch offenders.
What is also apparent from the extensive analysis herein is that ARPA was never
intended to lower science to the level of the criminal activity that ARPA exists to protect against.
Rather, ARPA is appropriately, as largely penal legislation, silent on matters of the scientific
study of archaeological remains. Indeed, it can be inferred from the analysis above that ARPA
was intended to promote scientific study by protecting specimens from theft.
Yet another fact stemming from the conclusion that ARPA does not grant the authority
for the government to limit scientific study is implicit in the results of the analysis herein.
Whether the 96th Congress realized it or not, it created legislation that, through its avoidance of
providing executive agencies with the authority to limit scientific study, insulates scientific
research from political pressure that may be exerted by the ruling political party at any given
time. This sort of academic freedom is essential to the conduct of unbiased science and must be
maintained throughout any future tweaks to the substance of ARPA.
The only way archaeological materials excavated pursuant to an ARPA permit can be
restricted as to scientific study is if those materials also fall under the types of materials covered
by NAGPRA.123 This small universe of NAGPRA-covered archaeological materials is also not
de facto off-limits to study. Such study must merely be carried out pursuant to the terms and
conditions provided for in that law. If NAGPRA does not apply to archaeological materials, then
there are no restrictions to the limits of scientific study, certainly none under ARPA.
123

See generally, 25 U.S.C. 3001 et seq. for a complete picture of what is covered by NAGPRA. It is
doubtful that even NAGPRA imposes restrictions on culturally unidentifiable remains and the extent to which any
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What then is the meaning of Judge Jelderks’ charge in Bonnichsen that the Kennewick
Man remains were to be made available for study “subject to the type of reasonable terms and
conditions that normally apply to studies of archaeological resources under ARPA”?124 First,
because Jelderks found, and the Ninth Circuit agreed,125 that NAGPRA does not apply to
Kennewick Man, the NAGPRA limitations for scientific study noted above do not apply.
Because, per this analysis, the federal agencies charged with enforcing ARPA cannot place limits
on scientific study, there would seem to be nothing left to limit the study of Kennewick Man.
Perhaps Jelderks’ language can be interpreted to mean that the remains should be
afforded respectful study. This should not be a problem, as all of the scientists analyzing the
remains are bound by ethical codes requiring them to do just that.126 Perhaps he was simply
referring to the fact that the Kennewick Man remains should be subject only to the types of
testing that are standard for such remains in the fields of archaeology and physical
anthropology.127 This would seem the logical interpretation. Based on the ARPA standard that
permits are to be issued only to “qualified professionals,” one would expect these professionals
to follow the conventions of analysis within their respective fields of study. Thus, it seems that
such restrictions may be applied under the remainder of the law have yet to be fleshed-out in litigation. This author
takes no position herein regarding the presence or absence of such limits in NAGPRA.
124
Bonnichsen, supra, note 3 at 1167.
125
See generally, Bonnichsen v. U.S., 367 F.3d 864 (C.A. 9, 2004).
126
See generally, Register of Professional Archaeologists, Code of Conduct and Standards of Research
Performance, URL: http://www.rpanet.org/, accessed Oct. 4, 2006; American Association of Physical
Anthropologists, Code of Ethics of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists, URL:
http://www.physanth.org/positions/ethics.pdf, accessed Oct. 4, 2006; American Anthropological Association, Code
of
Ethics
of
the
American
Anthropological
Association,
URL:
http://www.aaanet.org/committees/ethics/ethicscode.pdf, accessed Oct. 4, 2006.
127
Physical anthropology is one of the four major subfields of anthropology (the other three being sociocultural anthropology, anthropological linguistics, and archaeology). Practitioners within the subfield of physical
anthropology are generally considered to be experts in the area of human remains studies. See generally, Robert
Jurmain, Harry Nelson & William A. Turnbaugh, UNDERSTANDING PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND ARCHEOLOGY
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Jelderks’ charge was merely a guideline to the effect that the scientists studying the Kennewick
Man remains should perform such tests as are reasonable (i.e., have been proven through
repeated use and subjected to peer review) within archaeology and physical anthropology. Such
a charge would be in keeping with the dignity and respect due to human remains, while also
being consistent with ARPA’s intent to preserve archaeological materials for scientific study.
This would be a reasonable limitation to any analysis of archaeological materials.128
Finally, what is the source for some of the language in the Code of Federal Regulations
provisions shared by ARPA, NHPA, RSA, and the Antiquities Act that appears to imply that
limits can be placed on the study of certain historic/prehistoric things? It is very unclear, in
NHPA, whether or not that law purports to limit some scientific research in the interest of
preservation. However, if there is any such authority that subsequently showed up as a rule in
the CFR, it likely derives from 16 USC 462, squarely within NHPA, and should not be applied to
strictly ARPA matters, as there is no authority for such limitations in ARPA.
Based on the current analysis, it is clear that ARPA does not limit scientific study.
Rather, it promotes such study in the interest of the public obtaining a better understanding of the
human history of this nation through science.

(4th ed. 1990) at 5-11.
128
One final possibility if that all of the ARPA limits discussion by Jelderks was an effort merely to ensure
that the study of archaeological materials remains professional and that the Kennewick Man remains not be given
over to “quack-science” interpretations by such groups as the intervenors in Bonnichsen, the Asatru Folk Assembly.
See, Bonnichsen v. U.S., 969 F.Supp. 614, 618-619 (D. Or. 1997). This fringe religious group, who contend that
they have revived ancient Norse religion, intervened to assert that Kennewick Man was their own descendant and
thus clear evidence of an early European presence in the Americas. See, Asatru Folk Assembly, Asatru Folk
Assembly:
Asatru…The
Way
of
Our
Ancestors…Calling
Us
Home,
URL:
http://www.runestone.org/flash/home.html, accessed Oct. 4, 2006, for a discussion of the religion.
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